French Caesarism from Napoleon I to Charles De Gaulle

From 1797 to 1814 the French were governed by Napoleon I; from 1852 to 1870 by his nephew, Napoleon III; from 1940 to 1944 by Marshal Ptain (with Charles de Gaulle as his rival); and from 1958 to 1969 by de Gaulle himself. On each occasion, the coup d'tat which enabled the military man to take power was preceded by a period of progressive, left-wing politics. On each occasion, the military leader was succeeded by a more conventional form of civilian government. This book examines the paradox whereby the French, the most sophisticated people in Western Europe, have on four occasions been able to solve their political problems only by calling in a military figure. It provides a clear account of the contribution which the four leaders made to the social and political development of France and puts forward a number of possible reasons why French society remained vulnerable for such a long time to military takeovers. It also suggests a number of comparisons with the role played by the military in newly emergent nations. It compares the development of parliamentary democracy in France with what happened in English- speaking countries. It defines the phenomenon of Caesarism as `the assumption of power at a moment of real or alleged national crisis by a figure owing his prestige to genuine or associated military achievements'. Since France now seems to have evolved a workable system of democratic government, this book tells a historical story with a happy ending.