Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten

Interview with Elisabeth and Reinhard Selten.- On the State of the Art in Game An Interview with Robert Aumann.- Working with Reinhard Selten Some Recollections on Our Joint Work 1965-88.- and Survey.- Conceptual Ideas in Game Theory.- A Note on Imperfect Recall.- Futures Market Contracting When You Don't Know Who the Optimists Are.- Games of Incomplete The Inconsistent Case.- Admissibility and Stability.- Equilibrium Selection in Team Games.- Sustainable Equilibria in Culturally Familiar Games.- Evolutionary Game Theory.- Evolutionary Conflict and the Design of Life.- Evolutionary Selection Dynamics and Irrational Survivors.- Strict and Symmetric Correlated Equilibria are the Distributions of the ESS's of Biological Conflicts with Asymmetric Roles.- Applications of Non-Cooperative Game Theory.- Recurring Bullies, Trembling and Learning.- Dumb Bugs vs. Bright Noncooperative A Comparison.- Communication Effort in Teams and in Games.- Endogenous Agendas in Committees.- The Organization of Social A Noncooperative Approach.- Reinhard Selten Meets the Classics.- Equlibrium Selection in Linguistic Kial Ni (Ne) Parolas Esperanton?.- Relating Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Game Theory.- Are Stable Demands Vectors in the Core of Two-Sided Markets? Some Graph-Theoretical Considerations.- The Consistent Solution for Non-Atomic Games.- Finite Convergence of the Core in a Piecewise Linear Market Game.- Credible Threats of Secession, Partnership, and Commonwealths.- Principles in Behavioral Economics.- Rules for Experimenting in Psychology and Economics, and Why They Differ.- The Behavioral Foundations of Socio-Economic Games.- Adaption of Aspiration Levels - Theory and Experiment.- A Model of Boundedly Rational Experienced Bargaining in Characteristic Function Games.- Theory, Field, and The Continuing Dialogue.- Experimental Studies.- Naive Strategies in Competitive Games.- Induction vs. Deterrence in the Chain Store How Many Potential Entrants are Needed to Deter Entry.- Cooperation in Intergroup and Single-Group Prisoner's Dilemma Games.- On Styles of Relating to Bargaining Partners.- What Makes Markets Predict Well? Evidence from the Iowa Electronic Markets.- Sequencing and the Size of the Experimental Evidence.- Intertemporal Speculation under Uncertain Future Experimental Results.- Endowment Effect for Risky Assets.- List of Contributors.